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amended to state a cause of action. The trial court
defendants' view and repeatedly stated that the
could not be so amended. Faced with this attitude
apparently were convinced, and were
in
that a formal offer to amend would have been futile.
Plaintiffs should be permitted to amend their
to
meet, if possible, the deficiencies in their
noted.
with directions to the trial court
The judgment is
to permit plaintiffs to amend their
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds,
,J., and Schauer, ,J., concurred.

[Sac. No. 6473.
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M. F. GELHAUS et aL, Plaintiffs; A. F. GELHAUS et al.,
Appellants, v. NEVADA IRRIGATION DISTRICT,
Respondent.
[1] Waters- Public Utilities Selling Water- Duty to Furnish

Water.-A water company is not liable for damages resulting
from failure to supply water for particular use in absence of
specific undertaking to supply water for that use.
[2] Id.- Irrigation Districts- Liability for Failure to Supply
Water.-An irrigation district serving a mountainous county
through open canals and ditches may reasonably provide in its
contract with owner of fish hatchery that such owner acquires
no right to use water for other than irrigation purposes, and
it cannot be held liable for damages occasioned solely by inadequacy of its service to satisfy other purposes, such as
providing continuous supply of water to fish hatchery.
[3] !d.-Irrigation Districts-Contracts.-Contract by irrigation
district with owner of fish hatchery to furnish continuous
supply of water through hatchery to be used by owner's son
for irrigation of 20 acres of crop may not be reasonably construed as including water for use in hatchery, and fact that
district knew that such owner and other subscribers under
similar contracts used its water for raising fish or wanted water
primarily for that purpose is not evidence that, by contracting to supply w·ater for irrigation, it assumed obligation to
provide service adequate for hatchery.
[2] See Cal.Jur., Waters, §§ 631, 640.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Waters, § 640; [2, 't, 5] Waters,
§ 551; [3] Waters, § 529.
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[ 4] Id.- Irrigation Districts- Liability for Failure to Supply
Water.--By contracting with owner of fish hatchery to supply
continuous flow of water through hatchery for irrigation pur~
poses, irrigation district assumed only those risks that would
ordinarily result from temporary interruptions in supply of
water for irrigation, especially where owner of hatchery main~
tained reservoir to be used to supply hatchery in case of any
interruption in supply of water from district; and fact that
district on past occasions responded to owner's calls
ing service on those occasions did not indicate any
on
its part of obligation to supply water for hatchery purposes.
[5] Id.- Irrigation Districts- Liability for Failure to Supply
Water.-Irrigation district's conduct after executing contract
with owner of fish hatchery to furnish continuous supply of
water through hatchery for irrigation purposes does not estop
district from relying on stated purpose of its service a~
limitation on liability it assumed, where district at no time
l<'d owner of hatchery to believe that he could rely on its
service for supply of his hatchery, and where most he could
expect on basis of past experience was that service would
be restored a few hours after complaint was made.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Nevada
County. Arthur Coats, Judge.* Affirmed.
Action against irrigation district for damages for breach
of contract to supply water. Judgment for defendant notwithstanding verdict for plaintiff, affirmed.
Floyd H. Bowers and Thomas F. Sargent for Appellants.
Minasian & Minasian, P. J. Minasian, James K. Abercrombie, Vernon F. Gant, Ronald Harris, Harry Horton and
Rutherford, Jacobs, Cavalero & Dietrich for Respondent.
TRAYNOR, J.-Plaintiffs A. F. Gelhaus and Elvera H.
Gelhaus appeal from a judgment entered after the granting
of defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict in an action brought to recover damages for breach
of a contract to supply water. Stated most favorably to
plaintiffs, the facts are as follows: In May, 1950, defendant
irrigation district's ditch tender Huber took the application
of A. F'. Gelhaus, hereinafter referred to as plaintiff, for 10
miner's inehes continuous flow of water, knowing that plain~
tiff' would run it through his fish hatchery located on land
owned by him. It was understood that after the water was
*Assigned by Chairman of Judicial Council.
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it would be used by plaintiff's son
pasture land farmed by the latter.
acres
a written application for water prepared on
a form
by defendant. 'rhe application was also
signed by Huber and approved by defendant's main office.
It
that "The Applicant requests you to supply
water for In·igation purposes . . . . Continuous flow of 10
miner's inches . . . . To be used on the property owned by
A. F. Gelhatts . . . . Acres irrigated : Orchard ........ ,
Garden ....... , Pasture 20 ...... , Crop Acreages 20 ...... .
Service of water to be in accordance with conditions printed
on the back of this application . . . . " (The italicized parts
were written in on the printed form.) Although plaintiff's
son signed the application in the place provided for the applicant's signature, plaintiff also signed it in the blank following the words ''Collect from'' with the understanding
that he was to be a party to the contract. It was provided
on the back of the application that it was made "under and
subject to the By-Laws, Rules and Regulations, and rates of
tolls and charges adopted or to be adopted by the Board of
Directors'' of defendant, and a copy of the rules and regulations was given to plaintiff. On the morning of September
4, 1950, plaintiff discovered that the fish in his hatchery
were dead or dying owing to a water failure. No water was
running from defendant's ditch into plaintiff's ditch, and
plaintiff's reservoir, which could hold a two-day supply of
water, was empty. Although at the trial defendant introduced
evidence that there was no water shortage on September 4th
and that an adequate supply was being delivered to the ditch
that supplied plaintiff, plaintiff and another witness testified
that defendant's superintendent told them the day after the
fish were lost that the water had been shut off. On the basis
of the foregoing facts the jury returned a verdict in favor
of plaintiffs for $9,416, the value of the fish lost.
Defendant contends that the trial court properly granted
its motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the
ground that the written contract precludes imposing liability
for the loss of fish. It relies primarily on rule 15 of its
rules and regulations, which provides that "No purchaser of
any water from the District acquires any proprietary right
therein by reason of such use, nor does such purchaser acquire
any right to re-sell such water, or to use it for a purpose
other than that for which it was applied, nor to use it on

NEVADA IRRIGATION DIST.

C.2d

other than as stated at the time of making applicaI t has been held in this state that a water comliable for
resulting from a failure to
water for a particular use in the absence of a specific
water for that use. (Hunt Bros. Co.
to
v. San Lorenzo etc.
150 Cal.
59
P. 1093, 7 L.R.A.
Niehatts Bros. v. Contra Costa Water Co., 159 Cal.
P. 375, 36 L.R.A.N.S. 1045] ; see San Leandro
v. Ra1:lroacl
183 CaL 229, 233
P. 1] .) It would
appear that one purpose of rule 15 was to insure the applicability of the foregoing holdings and thus limit the risks assumed by defendant to those flowing from a failure to supply
water for the purpose stated in the application. [2] Moreover, it was entirely reasonable for defendant to limit its
undertaking. Defendant is an irrigation district serving a
mountainous county. Most of its water is supplied through
open canals and ditches. Thus the water supplied to plaintiff had to flow through 50 miles of mountain ditches
and flumes before it reached the Sontag ditch from which
plaintiff was supplied. The Sontag ditch itself ·was 2% miles
long, and plaintiff's outlet was the last of 14 on that ditch.
Defendant's experience demonstrated that it was impossible
to prevent interruptions in service at the end of such a ditch
system with the personnel available to it. Despite these difficulties, however, defendant was in a position to supply
adequate service for irrigation purposes. Temporary interruptions in such service would ordinarily be harmless and
the shortages so caused could be made up by supplying additional water after service was restored. A fish hatchery, on
the other hand, requires a constant flow of water to supply
oxygen to the fish, and an undertaking to supply water adequate for hatchery purposes would involve duties defendant
was not in a position to discharge. Accordingly, by providing
in its contract that plaintiff acquired no right to use the water
for other than irrigation purposes, defendant made clear that
it was under no duty to supply water for other purposes, and
it cannot therefore be held liable for damages occasioned
solely by the inadequacy of its service to satisfy such purposes.
[3] Plaintiff contends, however, that use of the water
for a fish hatchery was not excluded by the terms of the
contract but was included within the meaning of the provision for the irrigation of 20 acres of crop. He points out
that in the fish raising business it is common to refer to fish
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as a crop and to measure
so many
fish or
of fish per acre. He also relies on the extrinsic
evidence that Huber knew he wanted the water for his
hatchery; that other water users
hatcheries with
water supplied by defendant under the same contract provision; and that on 16 occasions defendant restored service
after interruptions at his request knowing that he was
in immediate need of water for his
\Vhen the provision for the irrigation of 20 acres of crop is considered in
the light of all of the
it is not reasonably susceptible of the interpretation contended
for by plaintiff, and the extinsic evidence relied upon by him
does not support his position.
The stated purpose for which the water was applied aptly
described the use to be made of it by plaintiff's son, who
signed the contract as applicant. Plaintiff's son had leased
20 acres of pasture from plaintiff on which he raised clover,
and he used the water supplied by defendant to irrigate this
land. There is no suggestion in the language of the contract
that another unspecified purpose was included within its
terms, and there was no evidence that plaintiff understood
the provision for water for irrigation of 20 acres of crop
to mean water for his hatchery. The surface area of the
water in the hatchery was not more than a fraction of an
acre, and plaintiff testified that he did not use the water for
irrigation thus indicating that he did not understand that
word in the sense for which he now contends. Moreover, the
only purpose for which plaintiff wanted the water was to run
it through his hatchery, and it is hardly conceivable that
bad he intended to have the right to do so secured by the
terms of his written contract, he would have left it to be
inferred from the provision that on its face deals only with
his son's needs.
The fact that defendant knew that plaintiff and other subscribers under similar contracts used its water for raising
fish or wanted it primarily for that purpose is not evidence
that by contracting to supply water for irrigation it assumed
the obligation to provide service adequate for a hatchery.
The operation of a fish hatchery requires a constant flow of
water to supply the fish with adequate oxygen. Irrigation
needs, on the other hand, may be met with much less regular
service, and shortages may be made up by additional service after temporary stoppages. [4] By contracting to
supply a continuous flow for irrigation purposes defendant
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assumed only those risks of damages that would ordinarily
result from temporary interruptions in the supply of water
for irrigation. On the other hand, it was of no concern to
defendant that its subscribers might run its water through
their hatcheries so long as defendant was not required to
provide service adequate for that use. Moreover, the record
makes clear that defendant did not at any time render adequate service to plaintiff for the supply of his hatchery and
that in the past plaintiff had governed his operations accordingly. He maintained a reservoir with a two-day capacity,
which he checked daily, and on three-hours notice he could
arrange to supply his hatchery with water from another
source. It does not appear from the record why these precautionary measures failed to prevent plaintiff's loss in this
case. Another of defendant's subscribers testified that he
had storage capacity for a week's supply of water because
he knew of the difficulties defendant had in supplying water.
On 16 occasions before the water failure of September
4th plaintiff had to notify defendant of a water shortage and on one of these occasions he lost some of his fish.
Since defendant was obligated to supply water for irrigation purposes, however, the fact that it responded to plaintiff's calls by restoring service on these occasions does not
indicate any admission on its part of an obligation to supply
water for hatchery purposes.
[5] There is likewise no merit in plaintiff's contention
that defendant's conduct after the contract was executed
estops it from relying on the stated purpose of its service
as a limitation upon the liability it assumed. Thus, as stated
above, defendant at no time led plaintiff to believe that he
could rely on its service for the supply of his hatchery, and
the most that he could expect on the basis of past experience
was that service would be restored a few hours after complaint was made. Plaintiff testified, however, that by the
time he discovered the water failure of September 4th. it was
too late to save his fish within the time ordinarily required
to restore service.
The judgment is affirmed.
Gibson, C. J., Edmonds, J., Schauer, J., and Spence J.,
concurred.
CARTER, J.-I dissent.
The majority opinion does not give proper effect to the
extrinsic evidence which the jury found adequate in con-
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struing the contract as requiring that water be supplied for
a fish hatchery.
\Vhen this case was before the District Court of
Third Appellate District, Mr. Justice Schottky of that court
prepared a very able and learned opinion which adequately
disposes of all of the issues in tl1is case, which
was
eoncurred in by Presiding Justice Van
and Mr. Justice
Peek of that court. The District Court of
in said
opinion held that the trial court erred in granting respondent's
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. It reversed
the judgment with directions to the trial court to enter judg.
ment on the verdict. The opinion of the District Court of
Appeal is reported in 265 P.2d at page 530. I am in full
accord with the views expressed by the District Court of
Appeal in said opinion and I adopt the same as my dissent.
Shenk, J., concurred.

[S. 1<'. Xo. 18964.

In Bank.

Jan. 14, 1955.)

Estate of ETHEL C. QUINN, Deceased. EDMUND G
BRO\VN, as Attorney General, etc., Appellant, v. PRES·
TON HATCH, as Guardian, etc., Respondent.
Estates-Jurisdiction.~-Probate proceedings being
purely statutory and therefore special in nature, superior
court, although court of general jurisdiction, is circumscribed
in this class of proceedings by provisions of statute conferring
such jurisdiction, and may not competently proceed in manner
essentially different from that provided.
[2] !d.-Heirship Proceedings-Parties.-Attorney general seeking
to enforce charitable trust created by a will which names
neither specifie eharity nor trustf•e is not authorized to initiate
;m heirship proceeding, hP not being "executor or adminis·
ti·ator" nor one "claiming· to be an heir . . . or entitled to
distribution," within Prob. Code, ~ 1080, though he may, in
<'vent one of authorized persons should file initial heirship petition, properly appear and urge his claim, or he may, in event
distribution should be sought, intervene and seek adjudication

[1] Decedents'

[1] See Cal.Jur.2d, Courts, § 10; Executors and Administrators,
19 et seq.
McK. Dig. References: [1] Decedents' Fjstates, ~ 3G;
Def:edents' Estates, § 986.1.
~

